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EMPLOYMENT LAW
Keith D. Boyette*
Robert T. Billingsley**
This survey article covers judicial developments in Virginia em-
ployment law between June 1989 and June 1990. The survey does
not address developments in the areas of workers' compensation or
unemployment compensation.
During the period covered by this survey, the case law in the
employment arena broke little new ground. Rather, the courts re-
fined and elaborated upon established principles. In the wrongful
discharge area, the courts were presented with several opportuni-
ties to address the parameters of the public policy exceptions to
the employment-at-will doctrine, the applicability of the statute of
frauds to employment contracts, and the contractual rights, if any,
arising from employment handbooks or manuals. In the covenant
not to compete area, the medical profession and allied services fig-
ured prominently as the courts wrestled with issues of public pol-
icy and applied traditional criteria to the evaluation of such
covenants.
I. WRONGFUL DISCHARGE LITIGATION
Since its strong reaffirmation of the employment-at-will doctrine
in 1987,1 the Supreme Court of Virginia has been relatively quiet
in the area of wrongful discharge litigation. During the period be-
tween June 1989 and June 1990, most of the significant battles in
this area were fought, instead, in the circuit courts of the
Commonwealth.
* Shareholder, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, P.C., Richmond, Virginia.
B.A., 1975, George Washington University; J.D., 1978, Washington and Lee University
School of Law.
** Associate, Hirschler, Fleischer, Weinberg, Cox & Allen, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. A.B.,
1976, College of William and Mary; J.D., 1980, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of
Richmond.
1. See Miller v. SEVAMP, Inc., 234 Va. 462, 468, 362 S.E.2d 915, 919 (1987). The court
stated that "[p]arties negotiating contracts for the rendition of services are entitled to rely
on [the employment-at-will doctrine's] continued stability." Id.
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In a series of cases, the circuit courts explored the parameters of
the "public policy" exception to the employment-at-will doctrine
first recognized by the Supreme Court of Virginia in Bowman v.
State Bank of Keysville2 in 1985. In Shaw v. Golding,' an at-will
employee alleged that his employment as a truck driver had been
terminated unlawfully because of his refusal to falsify trip logs and
to take trips without the rest periods mandated by the federal Mo-
tor Carrier Safety Act of 1984.4 Even though the employee's claim
was predicated upon federal law, the Circuit Court of the City of
Richmond held that the employee had stated "an actionable claim
for tortious retaliatory discharge in violation of Virginia public
policy." 5
In Roland v. Bon Air Cleaners, Inc.,' the Circuit Court of the
City of Richmond, also citing Bowman, refused to dismiss a wrong-
ful discharge claim brought by an employee who claimed she had
been discharged for filing a claim for partial unemployment com-
pensation benefits under the Virginia Unemployment Compensa-
tion Act.7 Similarly, the Circuit Court of the County of Fairfax, in
Millsap v. Synon, Inc.,8 ruled that an employee had stated an ac-
tionable claim by alleging that he had been fired for filing a wage
claim with the Virginia Employment Commission pursuant to sec-
tion 40.1-29 of the Code of Virginia (the "Code"). On the other
hand, the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk, in Roch v. S.C.O.V.,
Inc.,9 rejected a wrongful termination claim brought by the em-
ployee of a small software retailer who claimed she had been fired
for becoming pregnant. In rejecting the employee's claim, the court
2. 229 Va. 534, 331 S.E.2d 797 (1985). In Bowman, the court recognized a "narrow excep-
tion" to the employment-at-will doctrine for discharges in violation of public policy. Id.
Relying on Bowman, the employee in Miller characterized her dismissal as a retaliatory
discharge for her appearance as a witness at a fellow employee's grievance hearing and
urged the court to allow such claim to proceed on public policy grounds. The Supreme
Court of Virginia, however, rejected the invitation, stating that the "narrow exception" to
the employment-at-will doctrine recognized in Bowman was limited to discharges that vio-
late public policy. The court declined to expand the public policy exception so as to provide
redress for discharges violative of purely private rights or interests. Miller, 234 Va. at 462,
362 S.E.2d at 915.
3. No. LR-1333-4 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. Feb. 13, 1990)(order overruling demurrer).
Copies of all opinions cited herein are available from the authors.
4. 49 U.S.C. §§ 2501-2520 (Supp. IV 1986).
5. No. LR-1333-4, slip op. at 1 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. Feb. 13, 1990) (order overruling
demurrer).
6. No. LR-2980-2 (City of Richmond Cir. Ct. Mar. 16, 1990) (order overruling demurrer).
7. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 60.2-100 to -635 (Repl. Vol. 1987).
8. No. 95023 (Fairfax County Cir. Ct. Apr. 11, 1990)(order overruling demurrer).
9. No. L88-2825 (Norfolk Cir. Ct. Feb. 23, 1990).
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noted that a discharge for pregnancy "does not fit within the nar-
row exception permitting tort actions for discharge of at-will em-
ployees in violation of public policy underlying existing laws."'10
As the decisions above illustrate, Virginia courts have been un-
willing to apply the "public policy" exception to the at-will em-
ployment doctrine except in cases where the discharge was in re-
sponse to the employee's refusal to commit an unlawful act or in
response to the employee's exercise of a statutory right."
With its decision last year in Windsor v. Aegis Services, Ltd.,12
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit resolved
a split of authority within the Eastern District of Virginia as to the
applicability of the statute of frauds' 3 to an oral employment con-
tract providing for "just cause" dismissal. In Windsor, the court
affirmed the trial court's holding that an oral "just cause" contract
is unenforceable under the statute of frauds because it cannot be
performed fully within a year.
Although most Virginia circuit courts appear to be following the
holding in Windsor,4 a debate continues among Virginia employ-
ment law specialists as to whether the decision was correct. The
debate may soon end, however, with the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia's decision, made during its April 1990 session, to consider the
appeal in Falls v. Virginia State Bar.'5 In Falls, a former director
of administration for the Virginia State Bar is appealing the dis-
10. Id., slip op. at 2. The court also dismissed the employee's Title VII claim, because the
employer did not employ the 15 employees necessary for Title VII coverage, and it dis-
missed the employee's claim under the Virginia Human Rights Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.1-
714 to -725 (Repl. Vol. 1987), because the Act provides that it "shall not be construed to
allow tort actions to be instituted instead of or in addition to statutory actions for unlawful
discrimination and further provides nothing in the Act shall be construed to create an inde-
pendent or private cause of action to enforce its provisions." Roch, No. L88-2825, slip op. at
2.
11. The reluctance of Virginia courts to allow employees to sue their employers in tort for
wrongful discharge is further evidenced by Giordano v. Rosecan, No. 94153 (Fairfax County
Cir. Ct. Feb. 28, 1990), in which the Circuit Court of Fairfax County rejected an employee's
claims against his employer for breach of a duty of good faith and fair dealing and breach of
a fiduciary duty.
12. 869 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1989) (per curiam), aff'g 691 F. Supp. 956 (E.D. Va. 1988).
13. The Virginia statute of frauds provides, in pertinent part, that no action shall be
brought "[u]pon any agreement that is not to be performed within a year. . . [u]nless the
promise, contract, agreement, representation, assurance or ratification, or some memoran-
dum or note thereof, be in writing and signed by the party to be charged .. VA. CODE
ANN. § 11-2(7) (Repl. Vol. 1989).
14. See, e.g., Masini v. ICAFS, Inc., 16 Va. Cir. 153 (City of Richmond 1989); Hahn v.
Virginia Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 15 Va. Cir. 168 (City of Richmond 1988).
15. Record No. 900212.
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missal of his wrongful discharge claim, which he bases, in part,
upon allegations that he received oral assurances that he would not
be terminated so long as he performed his job in a satisfactory
manner.
Some employees' counsel claim support for their view that an
oral "just cause" contract is enforceable under Virginia law from
the Supreme Court of Virginia's recent decision in Elliott v. Shore
Stop, Inc.' In Elliott, a convenience store employee, when ordered
by her employer to take a polygraph examination, sent an imposter
to take the test instead. When the employee subsequently was dis-
charged by her employer on the grounds that she had failed the
examination, she filed suit against her employer and the company
that had administered the polygraph examination, asserting vari-
ous theories of recovery. The trial court, pointing to the employee's
"deceptive" and "dishonest" action in sending an impersonator to
take her polygraph examination, rejected all of the employee's
claims and dismissed her motion for judgment without leave to
amend.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia reinstated the em-
ployee's claims against her employer for fraud and breach of con-
tract,17 as well as her claims against her employer and the poly-
graph company for tortious interference with contractual relations.
Although the employee's contract claim was predicated upon the
existence of an oral "just cause" employment contract, at least one
court has opined that Elliott should not be viewed as an endorse-
ment of the enforceability of such a contract under Virginia law.' s
A discharged employee without a formal, written employment
agreement frequently will attempt to overcome the statute of
frauds by claiming that the terms and policies contained in an em-
16. 238 Va. 237, 384 S.E.2d 752 (1989).
17. Although the employee also had asserted a claim against her employer for "wrongful
discharge," claiming that her discharge was against public policy because it was fraudulent,
id. at 242, 384 S.E.2d at 754, the employee did not pursue this claim on appeal and thus it
was not addressed by the Supreme Court of Virginia in its decision. Id. at 243, 384 S.E.2d at
755.
18. In Sullivan v. Snap-On Tools Corp., No. 89-2065 (4th Cir. Jan. 26, 1990), the court of
appeals observed that
Elliott ... is a pleading-sufficiency decision holding only that the fact-specific oral
contract as pleaded in that case did suffice by its terms to overcome Virginia's at-will
contract presumption. It does not hold, nor does it stand implicitly for the proposi-
tion that such an oral contract is enforceable against a properly raised statute of
frauds defense.
Id., slip op. at 7 (emphasis added).
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ployment manual issued by the employer constitute a binding em-
ployment contract. Of course, to succeed in this endeavor, the em-
ployee must first show that he, in fact, received the manual.19 In
addition, he must be able to show that the policies as set forth in
the manual were intended by both parties to become part of a
binding employment contract.20 In Sullivan v. Snap-On Tools
Corp.,21 the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that an
employment manual that contains a less than all-inclusive list of
"infractions which may subject an employee to discipline" and
that contains "suggested disciplinary procedures, when no limit is
placed on an employer's discretion in their application, does not
imply that an employer may discharge an employee only for just
cause.
22
II. RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
During the period covered by this survey, a significant number
of the decisions reported in Virginia dealt with employees in the
medical profession and allied services. The courts addressed re-
strictive covenants which limited the ability of physicians and
salesmen of medical equipment to compete with their prior em-
ployers. Additionally, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the
enforceability of a covenant not to solicit employees contained in a
contract between a nursing home and a supplier of physical, occu-
pational and speech rehabilitation therapy services.
19. In Cunningham v. Ashland Chem. Co., No. 89-3289 (4th Cir. Apr. 4, 1990), the court
of appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of an employee's claim of breach of contract
because the employee had not shown that he had received the employment manual and
handbooks upon which his contract claim was based. Moreover, the court observed that the
manual contained a "conspicuous disclaimer" that expressly stated, in part: "THE COM-
PANY RESERVES THE RIGHT. :. TO TERMINATE EMPLOYEES AT ANY TIME
FOR ANY REASON .....
20. See, e.g., Bradley v. Colonial Mental Health & Retardation Servs., 856 F.2d 703 (4th
Cir. 1988). The court held that a personnel manual that intricately detailed "the offenses
that may subject an employee to discipline" and that described with particularity "the disci-
pline that may be administered for the enumerated offenses" formed a contract limiting the
employer's ability to discharge an employee without cause. Id. at 708.
21. No. 89-2065 (4th Cir. Jan. 26, 1990).
22. Id., slip op. at 5. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of the em-
ployee's claim that the employer had breached an oral "just cause" contract between the
parties. In affirming this aspect of the district court's ruling, the court of appeals cited its
earlier holding in Windsor v. Aegis Servs., Ltd., 869 F.2d 796 (4th Cir. 1989), but also ob-
served: "Oral assurances of job security predicated on satisfactory performance reflect the
employer's present intent to continue an employment relationship, as opposed to its as-
sumption of an obligation to do so. Such expressions are insufficient to rebut the strong
Virginia presumption that employment is at-will." Sullivan, slip op. at 6.
1990]
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A. Employment Covenants not to Compete
The Supreme Court of Virginia has applied settled criteria to
the evaluation of employment non-competition covenants for some
time. In a leading decision, Roanoke Engineering Sales Co. v. Ro-
senbaum,2 s these criteria were stated as follows:
(1) Is the restraint, from the standpoint of the employer, reasona-
ble in the sense that it is no greater than is necessary to protect the
employer in some legitimate business interest?
(2) From the standpoint of the employee, is the restraint reasona-
ble in the sense that it is not unduly harsh and oppressive in cur-
tailing his legitimate efforts to earn a livelihood?
(3) Is the restraint reasonable from the standpoint of a sound
public policy?24
In a decision announced March 2, 1990, the Supreme Court of
Virginia continued its trend of enforcing employment covenants
not to compete.25 In Blue Ridge Anesthesia & Critical Care, Inc. v.
Gidick,26 the court addressed the enforceability of a covenant not
to compete found in an employment contract between a salesman
and two servicemen, and their employer, a seller and servicer of
critical care and anesthesia equipment to hospitals and other med-
ical facilities in the District of Columbia, Maryland, North Caro-
lina, Virginia, and West Virginia. The covenant, entered into by
the parties at the time of each employee's employment, 2 provided
that:
In consideration of the covenants made herein by Employer, Em-
ployee agrees that if his employment terminates for any cause after
he has been employed for ninety (90) days, he will not, for a period
of three years thereafter, open or be employed by or act on behalf of
23. 223 Va. 548, 290 S.E.2d 882 (1982).
24. Id. at 552, 290 S.E.2d at 884 (citations omitted).
25. The Supreme Court of Virginia last refused to enforce a covenant not to compete in
Richardson v. Paxton Co., 203 Va. 790, 127 S.E.2d 113 (1962). Of course, the court decides
each case on the facts presented and no conclusion should be drawn that the court is predis-
posed to uphold employment covenants not to compete in all circumstances.
26. 239 Va. 369, 389 S.E.2d 467 (1990).
27. In Paramount Termite Control Co. v. Rector, 238 Va. 171, 380 S.E.2d 922 (1989), the
Supreme Court of Virginia enforced a covenant not to compete entered into by the parties
after commencement of the employment relationship.
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any competitor of Employer which renders the same or similar ser-
vices as Employer, within any of the territories serviced by agent of
Employer, expressly provided however, that this covenant does not
preclude Employee from working in the medical industry in some
role which would not compete with the business of Employer.2 s
Each of the employees had contact with the employer's
customers.29
The salesman was fired by the employer after being employed
for more than a year. The servicemen resigned their employment
after being employed for more than two years. Following his termi-
nation, the salesman established a competing business and the two
servicemen joined that company as salesmen.30
The employer instituted suit seeking damages and an injunction
almost six months after the first violation of the covenant by the
salesman, the first to leave. The trial court, in a decision rendered
almost nine months after the commencement of the litigation, held
the non-competition agreement invalid.31 The Supreme Court of
Virginia reversed.2
Applying the criteria set forth above, the supreme court first de-
termined that the employer had a legitimate business interest de-
serving of protection. In Blue Ridge Anesthesia, the legitimate
business interest was satisfied by evidence that the employees had
personal contact with the employer's customers.3 3 Next, the court
addressed whether the restrictive covenant was no greater than
necessary to protect the identified legitimate business interest and
was not unduly harsh and oppressive in curtailing the employee's
legitimate efforts to earn a livelihood. The court examined the geo-
graphic area encompassed by the covenant and the scope of activi-
ties proscribed.34
28. Blue Ridge Anesthesia, 239 Va. at 370-71, 389 S.E.2d at 468.
29. Id. at 371, 389 S.E.2d at 468.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 374, 389 S.E.2d at 470.
33. Id. at 372, 389 S.E.2d at 469. In Paramount, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
non-competition agreements were justified where the employee comes into contact with the
employer's customers as well as in the case where the employee actually acquired or pos-
sessed confidential information or trade secrets. Paramount, 238 Va. at 175, 380 S.E.2d at
925. Accord Meissel v. Finley, 198 Va. 577, 582, 95 S.E.2d 186, 190 (1956).
34. In addition to evaluating the territory and the scope of activities encompassed by a
restrictive covenant, Virginia courts will evaluate the length of the proscription in determin-
ing whether the covenant is no greater than necessary to protect the legitimate interest of
1990]
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With respect to the territory encompassed by the covenant, the
court noted that "the restriction . . . applies only in the 'territories
serviced by' the former employees, not [the employer's] entire
market area at the time the employees left [the employer's] em-
ploy, or later. '3 5 In addressing the scope of activities proscribed by
the covenant, the court observed that the employees were "only
prohibited 'from working in the medical industry in some role
which would . . . compete with the business of [the employer].' ,,36
Therefore, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that the re-
striction was reasonable in terms of the scope of activities pro-
scribed and the territory encompassed because "[t]he restriction
does not prohibit the former employees from selling critical care
and anesthesia equipment outside their respective former territo-
ries or from selling any other goods and medical equipment within
their former territories.''37
The supreme court rejected the employees' argument that the
non-competition covenant was unreasonable from the standpoint
of sound public policy because it restrained trade and promoted a
monopoly. Observing that, by definition, a restrictive covenant re-
strains trade to some extent, the court stated that the issue in the
public policy area was whether that restraint was unreasonable.
Finding that there was heavy competition in the field for the sale
and servicing of anesthesia and critical care equipment, the court
concluded that the restraint did not offend public policy."
Finally, the employer asked the supreme court to award a pro-
spective injunction, enforcing the covenant for a three-year period
running from the court's entry of an injunction against the em-
ployees. The court, noting that it had authorized the prospective
the employer. Worrie v. Boze, 191 Va. 916, 927, 62 S.E.2d 876, 881 (1951). The employees in
Blue Ridge Anesthesia, 239 Va. at 369, 389 S.E.2d at 467, however, did not attack the length
of the proscription contained in the covenant and, therefore, the court's opinion is silent on
that point.
35. Blue Ridge Anesthesia, 239 Va. at 373, 389 S.E.2d at 469. Accord Paramount, 238 Va.
at 175, 380 S.E.2d at 925. The Supreme Court of Virginia, on appropriate facts, has upheld
non-competition covenants which were coterminous with the territory in which the em-
ployer did business. E.g., Roanoke Eng'g., 223 Va. at 553, 290 S.E.2d at 885; Meissel, 198
Va. at 582-83, 95 S.E.2d at 190.
36. Blue Ridge Anethesia, 239 Va. at 373, 389 S.E.2d at 469.
37. Id. at 372, 389 S.E.2d at 469. For comparison, see the supreme court's decision in
Richardson v. Paxton Co., in which the court refused to enforce a restrictive covenant which
encompassed activities in which the employer was not engaged. 203 Va. at 795, 127 S.E.2d at
117.
38. Blue Ridge Anethesia, 239 Va. at 373-74, 389 S.E.2d at 470.
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enforcement of such a covenant previously, remanded for further
proceedings. 9
Three circuit courts also issued opinions of note during the pe-
riod covered by this survey with respect to employer covenants not
to compete. In Lifesource Institute of Fertility and Endocrinology
v. Gianfortoni,40 the Circuit Court of Henrico County enforced a
non-competition covenant against a physician. The non-competi-
tion covenant was carefully and thoroughly negotiated by the em-
ployer-physician and the employee-physician, both of whom were
advised by individuals with experience in the area of restrictive
covenants in the medical field.4' The restrictive covenant pre-
cluded competition by the employee-physician within one hundred
miles of Richmond, excluding the City of Norfolk and northern
Virginia.42 The covenant was narrowly drawn in terms of the scope
of activity proscribed precluding the employee-physician from per-
forming four specialized medical procedures, but permitting him to
practice conventional forms of gynecology and obstetrics as well as
39. Id. at 374, 389 S.E.2d at 470. The Supreme Court of Virginia first ordered an exten-
sion of the duration of a covenant beyond the period specified in the covenant in Roanoke
Eng'g., 223 Va. at 548, 290 S.E.2d at 882. In Roanoke Eng'g, the employee argued that such
prospective relief should only be granted where the employer "protected itself against the
consequences of delayed enforcement by providing for it expressly in the contract ....
The court rejected this argument noting that "[a]lthough some such language might well be
prudent in an era of increasing litigation delay, we do not think it to be a prerequisite to
relief on the facts of this case." Roanoke Eng'g, 223 Va. at 555, 290 S.E.2d at 886 (emphasis
added). The court emphasized that the contractual language used in Roanoke Eng'g was
agreed upon by four brothers and was part of a mutual scheme binding each of them
equally. The language had been used for eight years. Because the employee was equally
responsible for the selection and retention of the language, the court opined that he should
not be heard to complain of its insufficiency for its intended purposes.
The Supreme Court of Virginia next addressed the issue of prospective enforcement in
Paramount, 238 Va. at 171, 380 S.E.2d at 922. In Paramount, the court did not have a
factual situation analogous to Roanoke Eng'g in that the employee was not a co-equal in the
drafting of the covenant and the covenant was not part of a mutual scheme among the
owners of the company. In fact, unlike in Roanoke Eng'g, the employer in Paramount did
not specifically request prospective enforcement in connection with its appeal. Nevertheless,
the court extended the duration of the covenant by providing that it would be enforced for a
period commencing with the granting of the injunction. Paramount, 238 Va. at 177, 380
S.E.2d at 926.
Despite the Court's prospective enforcement of covenants in Blue Ridge Anesthesia and
Paramount without the unique facts presented in Roanoke Eng'g, counsel drafting restric-
tive covenants still would be prudent to include language in the covenant protecting the
employer against the consequences of delayed enforcement not contributed to by the
employer.
40. 18 Va. Cir. 330 (Henrico County 1989).
41. Id. at 331.
42. Id. at 332.
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infertility and endocrinology medicine in Richmond as well as
elsewhere.43
Gianfortoni is significant for two reasons. First, the court ad-
dressed whether a non-competition covenant applicable to an em-
ployee-physician violates public policy. The employee-physician
argued that such covenants were unethical and ill served the pub-
lic.44 The court noted that it was not bound by the private ethical
pronouncements of groups such as the American Medical Associa-
tion and that the employee-physician had voluntarily entered into
the covenant, such covenants were common within the medical
profession, and the employee-physician had voluntarily terminated
his employment.4 5 The court held that the covenant was not
against public policy and further stated that "it would be against
public policy to allow a person to accept the benefits of an agree-
ment but to disregard the terms of the agreement when it suits his
purpose. 4
6
Second, the employee-physician argued that the covenant should
not be enforced because the employer did not perform the four
proscribed procedures now that he had left, so that he would not
be in competition.4 7 Noting that the employer-physician had an
application pending for privileges to perform the proscribed proce-
dures and was recruiting another physician to perform the proce-
dures, the court found that it was anomalous for the employee-
physician who "precipitated" the situation to attempt to benefit
from it. 48 Observing that the covenant was for the protection of the
employer, the court rejected this argument.49
The Fairfax Circuit Court addressed covenants not to compete
in two cases involving physicians. In P.M. Palumbo, Jr., Inc. v.
Bennett,50 Dr. Palumbo terminated Dr. Bennett's services as an or-
thopedic surgeon approximately four years after contracting for
such services. The court never reached the analysis of the cove-
nant, holding instead that the contract itself was made in violation
43. Id. at 332-34.
44. Id. at 334. The employee-physician cited an opinion from the Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs of the American Medical Association which "discouraged" such covenants.
45. Id. at 335.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 336.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 336-37.
50. No. 112943 (Fairfax County Cir. Ct. Jan. 22, 1990).
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of a police statute. 1 Section 13.1-546 of the Code provides that a
professional corporation may render its professional services only
through its officers, employers and agents who are licensed or le-
gally authorized to render such services in Virginia.2 In Bennett,
the court concluded that Dr. Palumbo retained Bennett as an in-
dependent contractor and not as an officer, employee or agent.53
Therefore, the contract, being made "in violation of a police stat-
ute enacted for the public protection," was declared void and
unenforceable. 4
'In Northern Virginia Psychiatric Group, P.C. v. Halpern,55 two
licensed clinical social workers who had been employed for more
than four years were parties to a contract which proscribed an em-
ployee from soliciting the employer's past or present patients or
inducing anyone to refrain from referring patients to the employer
for a two-year period. The court's opinion does not state why the
covenant not to compete was determined to be unenforceable, al-
though the court sustained the employer's motion to dismiss. 6
Rather, the court's opinion focused on whether the court should
blue pencil the covenant 1 pursuant to a savings clause58 in the
contract. The court refused to modify the covenant so as to enforce
it despite the presence of a savings clause because (1) Virginia
courts are wary of applying "savings provisions" when addressing
statutes,59 (2) restrictive covenants in employment contracts are
disfavored and are to be construed in favor of the employee,60 (3)
restrictive covenants are restraints of trade,61 (4) modification of a
covenant by the court would violate article I, section 11 of the Vir-
51. Id., slip op. at 3.
52. VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-546 (Cum. Supp. 1990).
53. Bennett, slip op. at 3. The contract specifically provided that Dr. Bennett was not an
agent.
54. Id.
55. No. 113961 (Fairfax County Cir. Ct. Apr. 13, 1990).
56. Id., slip op. at 4.
57. Under the blue pencil rule, a court will modify and enforce an unreasonable covenant
to the extent that it is reasonable where it is clear from the terms of the agreement that the
covenant is severable. See Annotation, Enforceability, Insofar As Restrictions Would Be
Reasonable, Of Contract Containing Unreasonable Restrictions On Competition, 61
A.L.R.3d 397, 476-77 (1975).
58. A contractual savings clause generally provides that the employer and employee agree
that a court, in enforcing a non-competition covenant, may modify the duration, geographic
or scope of proscribed activity provisions if the court determines that they are unreasonable.
59. Halpern, No. 113961, slip op. at 3.
60. Id.
61. Id.
1990]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
ginia Constitution prohibiting interference with contracts, and (5)
such modification by the court would be against public policy.62
Ultimately, the court concluded that it did not want to become the
employer's scrivener6e
In sharp contrast to the court's analysis in Halpern, the Roa-
noke City Circuit Court in Consolidated Industrial Roofing, Inc. v.
Williams,6 4 enforced a two-year restrictive covenant which prohib-
ited the employee from engaging in "any business contemplated by
[the employer] in Roanoke, Virginia, or in any area within One
Hundred Fifty (150) Air Miles of Roanoke, Virginia." 5 The cove-
nant further provided that it was to "apply to all business endeav-
ors of [the employer], including, but not limited to roofing (both
new construction and repairs) and the sale of roofing supplies and
materials." 6
Williams is perhaps most interesting because of the manner in
which the court analyzed the scope of activities proscribed by the
covenant. As noted above, the covenant precluded competition in
"any business contemplated by" the employer. The court observed
that if it was to focus only on that language, it would conclude that
the scope of activities proscribed was overbroad."e However, the
court stated that it was required to give "plain meaning . . . to all
of the words employed."6 8 Therefore, the court referred to addi-
tional language in the covenant providing that it applied to all bus-
iness endeavors of the employer. The court held that "[g]iving
these words plain meaning necessitate[d] a finding that the parties
intended to preclude [the employee] from working in the roofing
industry. '69
Furthermore, in Williams, the court emphasized the facts
presented, noting that the employee "was aware that working for a
62. Id. at 4.
63. Id.
64. 17 Va. Cir. 341 (City of Roanoke 1989).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 342. In Williams, the court addressed public policy in the same fashion the
Supreme Court of Virginia did in Blue Ridge Anesthesia, by focusing on the highly competi-
tive nature of the employer's industry. Id. at 345. However, the court also examined the
adequacy of the supply of personnel willing to be employed. The court in Williams also
extended the duration of the covenant enforcing it from the date of the court's order for the
period stated in the covenant, rather than from the termination of employment. Id. at 346.
67. Id. at 344.
68. Id. (emphasis in original). The court cited Paramount, 238 Va. at 174, 380 S.E.2d at
925, for this proposition.
69. Williams, 17 Va. Cir. at 344.
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competing roofing company would violate the agreement" as the
employee had discussed the covenant with both his old and new
employers.70 The court also was influenced by the fact that the old
employer had offered inducements for the employee to remain,
that the employee also had another job offer which would not have
violated the covenant, and that he accepted new employment
knowing it would violate the covenant.7 1 Finally, the court ob-
served that the old employer was not motivated by malice or spite,
but rather by concern for its own well-being. 72 The court concluded
that these facts precluded the employee from establishing over-
breadth as a ground for avoiding enforcement. 3
The analysis of the court in Williams is unprecedented. While
the rules of construction clearly provide that a plain meaning must
be given to all the words employed, the court in Williams gave an
unnatural reading to the words "any business contemplated." In
fact, the language in the Williams covenant makes clear by the
phrase "including, but not limited to" that it is not limited to roof-
ing.7 4 Additionally, the "facts" focused on by the supreme court in
Roanoke Engineering and other cases in aid of the interpretation
and determination of a covenant are those which existed when the
covenant was entered into and during the employment relationship
as the covenant was modified or renewed, not the facts which ex-
isted at the moment of and after breach.7
The court in Williams essentially holds that no matter how over-
broad the covenant, enforcement will occur if the employee has vi-
olated what would have been a proper covenant. Thus, the court in
Williams comes close to adopting, though not overtly, the blue
pencil rule. The Supreme Court of Virginia has never adopted the
blue pencil rule.76 Further, the holding in Richardson v. Paxton
Co. precludes the analysis applied in Williams.77
70. Id. at 344-45.
71. Id. at 345.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 344.
75. Id.
76. The supreme court was presented with an opportunity to apply the blue pencil rule
and modify an unreasonable covenant not to compete but did not do so in Richardson, 203
Va. at 795, 127 S.E.2d at 117. The supreme court did not reach the issue of partial enforce-
ment in Roanoke Eng'g, 223 Va. at 552 n.2, 290 S.E.2d at 884 n.2. The Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit, applying Virginia law, has refused to judicially modify a restrictive cove-
nant. See Alston Studios, Inc. v. Lloyd V. Gress & Assoc., 492 F.2d 279, 285 (4th Cir. 1974).
77. Richardson, 203 Va. at 795, 127 S.E.2d at 117. The decision in Williams is also in
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UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
B. Covenants Prohibiting the Solicitation of Employees
In Therapy Services, Inc. v. Crystal City Nursing Center, Inc.,"8
the Supreme Court of Virginia for the first time addressed the en-
forceability of a provision in a contract between two businesses re-
stricting employment by one of the parties of certain individuals
employed by the other party for a period of time. Therapy Services
provided skilled rehabilitation services, through certified physical,
occupational and speech therapists, pursuant to a contract with
Crystal City. Crystal City covenanted not to hire any of Therapy
Services' staff during the life of the contract and for six months
following its termination. 9 Crystal City terminated the contract
and sought to hire employees of Therapy Services through an inde-
pendent contractor."s
The Supreme Court of Virginia noted that the covenant prohib-
iting the solicitation of employees was a restraint of trade and
would be void if it was unreasonable as between the parties or was
injurious to the public.8" The court addressed the issue of reasona-
bleness by focusing on whether the covenant afforded "fair protec-
tion to the interests of the party in favor of whom it [was] given,
and [whether it was],not so large as to interfere with the interest of
the public." 2 The court concluded that Therapy Services had a
"legitimate interest in protecting its ability to maintain profes-
sional personnel in its employ. ... 83
In addressing the issue of whether the covenant was injurious to
the public, the court focused on both the interest of the employees
whose employment was proscribed and the public at large. With
respect to the employees, the court noted that such employees had
no right to a specific employment, and that therapists were in low
supply and in high domand in the relevant geographic area so that
alternative employment was readily available.8 4 As to the public at
large, the court observed that the "availability of therapists' ser-
vices was not diminished since the affected therapists were not
sharp contrast to the decision in Grant v. Carotek, Inc., 737 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1984) (apply-
ing Virginia law).
78. 239 Va. 385, 389 S.E.2d 710 (1990).
79. Id. at 386-87, 389 S.E.2d at 711.
80. Id. at 387, 389 S.E.2d at 711.
81. Id. at 388, 389 S.E.2d at 711.
82. Id. (quoting Merriman v. Cover, 104 Va. 428, 436, 51 S.E. 817, 819 (1905)).
83. Therapy Servs., 239 Va. at 388, 389 S.E.2d at 711-12.
84. Id. at 389, 389 S.E.2d at 712.
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precluded from working" in the relevant geographic area or else-
where.8 5 The court therefore enforced the covenant.86
85. Id.
86. Id.
1990]

